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ASPECTS OF THE OPTIMAL MANAGEMENT OF EXCHANGE RATES
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This paper analyzes aspects of the economics of the optimal management
ofexchange rates. It shows that the choice of the optimal exchange rate re-
gime depends on the nature and the origin of the stochastic shocks that affect
the economy. Generally, the higher is the variance of real shocks which
affect the supply of goods, the larger becomes the desirability of fixity of
exchange rates. The rationale for that implication is that the balance of
payments serves as a shock absorber which mitigates the effect of real shocks
on consumption. The importance of this factor diminishes the larger is the
economy's access to world capital markets. On the other hand, the desirability
of exchange rate flexibility increases the larger are the variances of the
shocks to the demand for money, to the supply of money, to foreign prices and
to purchasing power parities. All of these shocks exert a similar effect and
their sum is referred to as the "effective monetary shock." It is also shown
that the desirability of exchange rate flexibility increases the larger is the
propensity to save out of transitory income. When the analysis is extended to
an economy which produces traded and non—traded goods it is shown that the
desirability of exchange rate flexibility diminishes the higher is the share
of non—traded goods relative to traded goods and the lower are the elasticities
of demand and supply of the two goods.
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312/753—4516I. Introduction
This paper deals with the problem of the choice of an optimal ex-
change rateregime for a small open economy. Previous analyses of the choice
betweenfixed and flexible exchange rate systems centered around questions
of stabilization policies, the effect of capital irobility on the efficacy
of monetary and fiscal policies, the role of speculation in the foreign ex-
change market, the nature and origin of exogenous disturbances, and the like.
Subsequentdiscussions originating with contributions in the 1960s by Mundell
(1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) haveshifted the focus of analysis
tothe choice of the optimal currency area. The shift of emphasis reflected
the recognition of the fact that the optimal exchange rate regime need not be
the same for all countries. Rather, a country might find it useful to main-
tain a fixed rate with some currencies while having a flexible exchange rate
with some other currencies.
The analysis in this paper recognizes that the spectrum of possibilities
open for the various economies is much broader than the one implied bythe
frameworkof analysis of the optimal currency area. Rather than dividing
theworld into currencies among which exchange rates are flexible and those
amongwhichexchange rates are fixed, one might consider the optimaidegree
offixity of exchange rates between each pair of currencies. In this frame-
workthe choice of an exchange rate regime between any pair of currencies need
not be a fixed or a flexible rate but rather it might be some optimal mix
of the two extremes. The optimal mix is referred to as the optimal managed
(or dirty) float and the determinants of the optimal degree of exchange
rate management is the subject of this paper.
The analytical framework that is outlined below builds upon, and
extendsthe analysis of recent papers by Fischer (1976) and Gray (1976).
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Fischer analyzes the choice between the two extreme exchange rate systems
in terms of thesource ofexogenous disturbances. He demonstrates that when
the exogenous shocks are real, the variance of steady—state consumption is
lower under a fixed exchange rate system than under a flexible rate system.
On the other hand, when the exogenous shocks are monetary, the opposite
holds and the flexible rate system is preferred to the fixed rate system.
Gray's paper deals with wage indexation in a closed economy and develops
the concept of the optimal degree of wage indexation when the system is
subject to real and monetary shocks which occur simultaneously. Lack of
complete information precludes identifying the effect of each shock separ-
ately, and thus results in the optimal degree of wage indexation. In what
follows we combine the two approaches of Fischer and Gray into a framework
which yields an index measuring the optimal degree of fixity of exchange
rates, i.e., the optimal managed float. Section II describes the analytical
frameworkandanalyzesthe problem for an economy whose production consists
onlyof commodities that are traded internationally. It is shown that the
majordeterminantsofthe optimal managed float are the variances of and the
covariances among the various shocks that affect the economy.1 In section III
we extendthe analysis to an economy which produces tradable as well as
1The analytical framework is adapted from Frenkel (1976, 1980). For
an early analysis of the optimal exchange rate regime in terms of the structure
of the economy see Stein (1963). Modigliani and Askari (1973) have emphasized
thatthe optimal exchange rate regime depends on the nature of the shocks
and that the optimum maybean intermediate system between fixed and flexible
rates,e.g., sliding parities. A similar emphasis on the origin of shocks
is found in Flood (1979) ,Buiter(1977). and Enders and Lapan (1979) who also
emphasize the stochastic nature of the various shocks.3
non—tradable goods and examine the dependence of the optimal managed float
on the composition of production. Section IV contains some concluding re-
marks.
II. Optimal Managed Float with only Tradable Goods
In this section we analyze the determinants of the optimal degree of
exchange rate management for an economy which produces only tradable goods.
We start with a presentation of the analytical framework.
11.1 The Analytical Framework
The key characteristic of the analytical framework is the specification
of the stochastic structure of the economy. Consider a small economy that
is subject to three types of repetitive and serially uncorrelated shocks.
These shocks which are specified below are referred to as real, nonetary, and
foreign shocks.
Denotethe supply of output by and assume that
(1) =ye; N(—c2/2,02)
where p is astochastic disturbance with a constant variance 2Themean
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of the distribution of p is chosen to be _02/2 so as to assure that the ex-
pected value of output E(Y) equals y. Thus, y is referred to as permanent
income andpis referred to as the real shock.Itcan be shown that a is
p
approximatelyequal to the standard deviation of current income as a per-
centage of permanent income.2
2 2 2
E(Y)
=y,E(Y) =y2e°Pand var(Y) =y2(e—1);thus
2 2
a/E(Y) =y(e—1)2/y=(e-1)1/2
(footnote continues p. 4)4
The second source of disturbances arises from the monetary sector of
the economy. Let the demand for nominal balancesL be
(2) Lt =kPYe; N(—a2/2,a2)
wherek is the Cambridgek denoting the desired ratio of money to income, P
denotesthe domestic price level and c denotes the stochastic distrubance
to the demand for money, where again its time subscript has been omitted.
Analogous to the distribution of the real shock, the standard deviation of
the monetary shock a is approximately equal to the standard deviation of
the income velocity as a percentage of permanent velocity.
The third source of disturbances stems from the foreign sector. Denote
the foreign price level by P and let it be related to its permanent value
paccording to
X1 2 2 (3) =p*e ; N(—c /2,a
xl xl
Thus, x1 denotes the shocks due to variability of foreign prices. Again, a
xl
is approximately equal to the standard deviation of foreign prices as a per-
centage of their mean.
The domestic price level is linked to the foreign price level through
the purchasing power parity which is assumed to be satisfied except for
random deviations. The stochastic deviations from purchasing power parity
(footnote 2 continued)
for small a. It should be clear that the choice of a2/2 as the mean of
the distribution ofis made solely for analytical convenience. None of
the results are affected by rescaling the distribution so as to move its
mean to zero. To simplify notations we have suppressed in equation (1) the
subscriptt that is attached to the realization of the shock ii.Wewill
follow the same convention in subsequent specifications of shocks.S '5.5 -— — — —,— r-". ..44— . nL. -_._.... —.4,se--t.. .t —6
Thus, the equilibrium exchange rate is
(7) St =(Mt/kp*y)e+
andthe percentage change thereof is
(8) log S —logS1 =1og(M/kS1p*y)
—(p+E+x)
Forthe other extreme regime of the fixed exchange rate system, the exchange
rate does not change and therefore
(9) log S, —logS_1 =
Using(8) and(9) we may definean index i such that 0 E y 1:
(10) y(log S —logS1)/[1og(M/kS1p*y) —(u+c+x)
Inequation (10) theparameter y characterizesthewhole spectrum of exchange
rate regimes. In the two extreme systems of a fixed and freely flexible
exchange rates, the value of the coefficient y is zero and unity, respectively.
Between these two extremes there is the wide rangeof possible mixturesof
thetwo extremes. The coefficient y maybeviewed as indicating the fraction
ofmoney market disequilibrium that is allowed to be eliminated through
changes in the exchange rate. In what follows we will refer to y as the co-




The optimal managed float strategy is necessary because it is assumed7
thatthe government (as well as the private sector) possess information that
is incomplete. If information was complete and during each period the various
shocks could be observed andidentifiedseparately, an optimal policy would
beto allow changes in the exchange rates to correct only for themonetary
disturbancesand not for the real disturbances. This is essentially the
main insight from Fischer's paper (1976). In introducing incomplete
informationit isassumed that during a given period only the joint outcome
ofthe various shocks is known but not their separate valtes. Because complete
informationis not available,policymakers face a signal extraction problem
andsomesecond—best policy is required.
It is assumed that the objective is to minimizethe losses due to
imperfect information, and that the policymaker seeks to minimize the
quadratic loss function H:




where c denotes the rate ofconsumption which, from the budget constraint,
equalsthe rate of income minus the real value of additions to cash balances
tIM
(13)c =YttPt




=y(e'-1)—aky[e (Mt p*y)1 -i-c)+xh' l)
and using (14) in (12) yields the loss function which is to be minimized with
respect to the intervention index
31n a recent analysis of the optimalforeign exchange intervention,
Boyer(1978) extends and applies Poole's framework (1970) to the problem at
hand. Boyer assumes that real income is fixed and that the objective function
is to minimize the variability of prices.8
Inspection of (14)suggests that in addition to finding the optimal
y,the policymaker might want to pursue what Fischer terms "active" monetary
policy bysetting the beginning of period holdings of cash balances Mtl at
some desired level. It is assumed that at the beginning of each period the
monetary authority changes the money supply so as to compensate for past
disturbances. Thus, the money supply is set at that level for which
(15) Mt =kS1p*ye; 5N(—a/2, o)
The stochastic term 5 in (15) denotes the stochastic shock to the money supply.
It reflects the possibility that in setting the money supply the monetary
authoritiesare unable to avoid stochastic deviations from their target.4
Recalling that the shock to the demand for money is denoted by ,thenet
monetary shock, i.e., the shock to the excess demand for money, is c —5.
4it siiouji be noted that thespecification of the "active" monetary
policy is somewhat arbitrary since, in principle, other rules are possible.
For example, one couldspecify a rule bywhich the monetary authority sets
Mtso as to ensure equality between the values of the mathematical expectations
of the streams of consumption and income, i.e.,E(c) =E(Yt).Further,
equation (14) suggests that the monetary authority possesses two instruments
for the attainment of its policy goals: a ''policy--theoptimal intervention
index and anpolicy--the optimal stock of money at the beginning of each
period. The general optimization procedure would then solve simultaneously
for the optimal combination of M and yso as to minimize the loss function.
Inthe following section we report and analyze the resultsof computer simulations
thatare based on determiningaccording to Fischer's specification of
"active" monetary policy. We have experimented with the other two alternative
monetaryrules. It turnsout that, at least for the range of parameters that
havebeen assumed, the resulting optimal intervention index is almost in-
variant among the various monetary rules for the choice ofMt and thus, for
ease of exposition, we report only simulations using Fischer's rule. It is
also relevant to note that under rational expectations theprecisespecification
of the Mt policy is completely irrelevant for the key results; for an explicit
demonstration of this point see Aizeninan (1980).9
II. 3 TheOptimal Intervention Index
Having outlinedthe objective function we now turn to the solution
of the optimal intervention index which will bedenoted by y. To simplify
the computations we approximatethediscrepancy between consumption andex-
pected income by the first two terms of a Taylor expansion ofequation (14).
Thus
(14') [c —E(Yt)]Eu — (1-i)akOly
where the expansion is carried out around azero value of the shocks.5 In
equation (14') 0denotesthe sum of all shocks, that is,
01+X+E—(S
and,under full flexibility of exchange rates(when 'y=l), money market equilibrj
implies that the percentage fall in theexchange rate equals 0.
Minimization of the loss functionrequires that the value of y in(14')
ischosen so as to minimize the squareddiscrepancy between p and (1 —y)akO.
This minimization amounts tocomputing the ordinary least squares estimate





andwhen all shocks are independent of each other, the optimal intervention
indexbecomes:
5The expansion isaround zero in order to ensure that the approximation
would be around the expected value of the function; thuswe approximate
e by (1 +p)and thereby we have that E(e) =1.Likewise, as was shown in
footnote 2, a2 a. It should be noted that incomputing the loss




2 2 ak[a +a
(x-e—)
2. . 2
where is expressed as the sum of the variance of the real shock a and
the variance of the effective monetary shock The intuition under-
lying equations (16) and (16') can be provided in terms of the signal extraction
problem which is faced by the policymaker given the assumed informational
structure. From his knowledge of the intervention rule and roni the observed
changein the exchange rate, the policymaker can infer themagnitude of the
globalshock e.It is assumed that only the valueof eis known but
not the individual components of the global shock. The signal extraction
problem amounts to an attempt to estimate the unobserved value of the real shock
from the known value of 0 (that is inferred from the change in the exchange rate).
Inspection of (16) and (16') reveals that when=0so that the
disturbances arecomposedonly of effective monetary shocks, y* =1andthe
optimalexchange rate regime is that of complete flexibility. On the other
extreme for which a2 =0so that the disturbances are entirely of a
(X+c—ô)
realorigin, the optimal intervention index is set to equalzero and the
optimalexchange rateregime isthat of fixed rates.7 In general, when both
6Since the effective foreign price shock x (which is composed of the
shock to foreign prices, x1 and the shock to purchasing power parities, x2)
exerts similar effects as shocks to the excess demand for money,-5,their
sum(+—S)is referred to as the effective monetary shock. Sincerepre-
sents a chnqe in taste, wa assume that the objective Function remains invariant
with respect to this shock. If the objective function iere to depend on ,we
would have had to assume that there areno shocks to money demand. Inthat
casetheeffective monetary shock should be read as x— instead of x-l-E—5.
7From (16) and (16'), when the effective monetary shock is zero,
=1— whereck denotes the marginal propensity to save (hoard) out of
transitory income. When ctk =1,the loss function is minimized when =0.
For ck <1,y is set to equal zero since we rule out negative values.11
types of shocks are present, the optimal intervention index is within the
range (0,1) and the optimal exchange rate system corresponds to neither of
the extremes of a completely fixed or of a completely flexible rate regime.
In that case the optimal system is an intermediate system, i.e., a system
of an optimal managed float.
Themagnitude of the optimal intervention index depends on thecharac-
teristics of the shocks. As maybeinferred from ecuation (16), as long as
the covariance between iand(ii-I-X+c-S) is positive, the optimal intervention
indexdepends negatively on the variance of the real shock. Thus,
(17).<0.
11
High variance of real shocks, ceteris oaribus, tends to raise the desirability
of greater fixity of exchange rates. Small economies, and in particular
developing countries, tend to have concentratedproduction patterns and
thus,arelikely to have higher variance of real shocks than more diversified
economies. Ceteris paribus, these economies will find it optimal to have
greaterfixity of exchange rates.
Similarly, equation (16) implies that as long as the covariance between
the effective monetary shock (+-S) and the global shock (ii+x+€-5) is positive,




High variance of the effective monetary shock tends to raise the desirability
of greater flexibility of exchange rates.
Equation (16) also implies a definite relationship between ck--the12
propensity to save out of transitory income——and the optimal intervention
index. As long as the covariance betweenand (T.1+x+€-6) is positive, a
higher value of ctkisassociated with a higher value of y*.
(19) 0
Thus, high speed of adjustment to asset disequilibrium (high c) and low velocity
of circulation (high k) tend to raise the desirability of greater flexibility
of exchange rates. This result may be rationalized by noting that the effect
of any given value of the real shock on the excess flow demand for money
depends positively on ck. Since the desirability of greater flexibility in-
creases with the extent of monetary shocks, and since the monetary disequilibrium
which corresponds to a given real shock is larger the higher is the saving
propensity, it follows thattheeffect of cik on -y is similar to the effect
of a rise in the variance of the effective monetary shock.
From equation (16') it is clear that the results in (17), (18) and (19)
must hold when the various shocks are independent of each other. Further,
inspection of equations (16) and (16') suggests that what is relevant for
the optimal intervention index is not the absolute macTnitude of the variances
of the various shocks but rather their relative magnitude. In general, when
the ratio between the variances of the effective monetary shock and the
real shock approaches infinity (either because the former approaches infinity
or because the latter approaches zero) the optimal exchange rate system is
that of freely flexible rates. Likewise, when the same ratio approaches
zero(either because the variance of the effective monetary shock approaches
zero or because the variance of the real shock approaches infinity) the
optimal exchange rate system is that of fixed rates.
Since the optimal intervention index depends negatively on the
variance of real shocks and positively on the variance of the effective13
monetary shock, it is clear that its dependence on the covariance between
these two types of shocks is ambiguous since it depends on the relative




Thus,if the variance of the real shock exceeds the variance of the effective
monetary shock, a rise in the value of the covariance between these shocks
results in a higher value of the optimal intervention index and raises the
desirability of greater flexibility of exchange rates. This result may be
interpretedby noting that when the covariance between the two types of
shocks is zero while the variance of the real shocks is large relative to that of
theeffective monetary shock, the optimal intervention index is low since the
optimal exchange rate regime is close to that of a fixed exchange rate. Under
these circumstances, a rise in the covariance between the shocks implies that
any given real shock is now being accompanied by a monetary shock. Theinduced
risein the importance of the monetary shock results in a higher value
of the optimal intervention index, and increases the desirability of greater
flexibility of exchange rates. A similar result as in (20) also applies
to the analysis of the dependence of the optimal intervention index on the
correlationbetween the twotypes of shocks.
11.4 Illustrative Computations
Theanalysis of the properties and the determinants of theoptimal
interventionindex was based on a Taylor approximation of the loss function.
Asisobvious, the accuracy of this approximation depends negatively on
themagnitudes of the shocks. While the qualitative conclusions do not
depend on the accuracy of the approximation, the quantitative estimates
mightbesomewhat affected. To gain insight into the precise quantitative14
magnitude of the optimal intervention index we report in Table 1 illustrative
computations for the case in which the shocks are independent of each other.8
Thesecomputations are performed for alternative values of the propensity
tosave out of transitory income as well as for alternative assumptions
concerningthe magnitudes of the various shocks as measured by the standard
deviations o and These results illustrate the negative dependence
of *onc-—the standard error of the real shock as well as the positive
dependence of y on -—the standard error of the effective monetary
shock,and on ak——the propensity to save out of transitory income.
In computing the optimal intervention index in Table 1, it was assumed
that the covariances among the various shocks were zero. In Table 2 we allow
for various covariances among some of the shocks and we report the resulting
optimal intervention index. Consider first the comparison between panels A
andBof Table 2. In panel A all three shocks are assumed to be of the
magnitude of 3 percent while in panel B all three shocks are assumed to be
of the magnitude of 9 percent. As is apparent, tripling of the magnitudes
of the shocks while maintaing their ratios constant, does not seem to have
a significant effect on the optimal intervention index. This illustrates
the proposition that the optimalintervention index depends on the ratios
ofthe various shocks rather than on their actual magnitude.
Panels C, D andEof Table 2 illustrate the effects of changing the
ratio among the various disturbances. When the magnitudes of the foreign
price disturbance or of the domestic monetary disturbance are high relative
81n these computations the optimal intervention index was obtained by using
equation (14) in the loss function (12) and minimizing with respect to y.
We are indebted to Michael Bazdar±ch for helpful assistance in the computations.15
TABLE1
OPTIMAL MANAGED FLOAT FOR ALTERNATIVE VALUES OF REAL ANDEFFECTIVE
MONETARYDISTURBANCES AND SAVING PROPENSITIES
Nx+—
u
xk =.5 ctk =1
.01.03.05.07.09 .01.03.05.07.09
.01 .0 .80.92.96.98 .50.90.96.98.99
.03 .0 .47.69.80.87 .10.50.74.85.90
.05 .0.0.0 .33.53 .04.27.50.67.77
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.47 .56 .62 .67 .71
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to the other shocks (panels CandE, respectively) theoptimalintervention
index isclose to unity and thus, the optimal regime is closer to that of a
freelyflexible rate.On the other hand, when the magnitudeof the real
shockis high relative to the other shocks (panel D), the optimal inter-
vention index is low and the optimal exchange rate regime iscloser to that
of fixed exchange rates.
The various panels of Table2also illustrate the effects of the co—
variances among foreign and domestic disturbances. Generally speaking, a
positive covariance between foreign price shocks and domestic monetary
shocks tends to raise the optimal intervention index and thereby lower the
desirability of fixed rates. Consistent with the results in equation (19),
the effect of a positive covariance between foreign price shocks and domestic
real shocks is ambiguous and depends on the sign of the difference between
the variance of the real shock and the variance of the effective monetary
shock. When this difference is negative, as in panels C and E, a rise in
cov(x,) is associated with a decline in y. Likewise, when this difference
is positive, as in panel D, a rise in cov(X,) results in a higher value of
the optimal intervention index.
11.5 Balance of Paytrnts Variability
The logic underlying the optimal degree of exchange rate management
is that the optimal response to monetary shocks differs from the optimal
response to a real shock. Monetary shocks are best dealt with through ex-
change rate changes while real shocks are best dealt with through trade
flows. Using the terminology of Mundell (1973) and Laffer (1973), under
the fixed exchange rates the current account (which equals the balance of
payments in the absence of capital flows) cushions the effects of real
shocks. As a result, large variability of real shocks yields large variability18
of the balance of payments. In what follows we examinethevariability of
thebalance of payments under the optimal degree of managed float.
Wefirst note that the discrepancy between consumption and expected









The first term on the right-hand side denotes the deficit in the trade
balance (which equals the balance of payments in the absence of capital flows)
andthe second term denotes transitory income. Minimization of the loss
function amounts to choosing the optimal intervention index so as to minimize
the average squared deviation of transitory income from the balance of pay-
ments deficit.Transitory income is iy and the balance of payments deficit
is (1 -y)ck8ywhich measures the fraction of money market disequilibrium
that is not allowed to be cleared through exchange rate changes. It follows
that the varianceof the balance of paynnts,canbe expressed as the
variance of (1 -)ctkOy.Substituting equation (16') for the optimal value
of y (under the assumption that the shocks are independent of each other)










Thus,given the variability of the global shock 0, a rise in the weightof19
real variability in total variability increases the variability of the optimal
balance of payments. This relationship suggests that, ceteris paribus,
countries for which real variability comprises a relatively large share of
total variability should hold larger stock of international reserves in order
to be able to facilitate the relatively high variance in the optimal balance
of payments.
11.6 The Capital Account
An important limitation of the analysis in the previous sections has
been the assumed absence of an integrated world capital market which reflects
itselfin the capital account of the balance of payments. As a result, the
previous analysis identified the trade balance with the balance of payments.
Whilesucha simplification mightbeappropriate for economies with severe
limitationson access to world capital markets, it may not represent the
conditions faced by developed countries. In what follows we introduce some
elements of the capital account.
It is assumed that the economy facesa perfect world capital market
inwhich it can borrow and lend at a fixed rate of interest. Suppose that
the desired ratio of money to securities depends on the rate of interest
and, due to the assumed fixity of the world rate of interest this ratio is
also fixed. Since the economy may be a net debtor or a net creditor in the
world capital market, the value of its permanent output need not equal the
value of its permanent income. The analysis simplifies considerably by
assuming that the world rate of interest is deterministic since in that case
the stochastic characteristics of output are similar to those ofincome.9
9Flood (1979) analyzes the implications of stochastic interest rates
onthe choice of the exchange rate system.20
As a result, the previous analysis which minimized the squared deviation of
consumptionfrom permanent output remains relevant even though the concepts
ofincome and output need not coincide. The only difference that has to be
kept in mind is that when the economy has an access to world capital markets
the previous analysis applies to the current account rather than to the
overall balance of payments.
The signal extraction problem is similar to that in section 11.3.
Individuals are assumed to observe the global shock 0i.i++c-5, from which
they attempt to estimate the real shock componentand, thereby,thevalue
oftransitory income ity(wheredenotes the estimatedreal shock given the
realizationof0). The least squares estimate of the real shock is:
(23) E(pI0) =cov(i,0)
(10
which,whenmultiplied by y, provides the estimated value of transitory
income. In the previous analysis we argued that the optimal policyshould
aimat minimizing the squared discrepancy between transitory income and the
current account (which was equal to the balance of payments). Suppose now
that, given the rate of interest, portfolio holders wish to add to their
holdings of securities a fractionof their estimated transitory income.
Under these circumstances, only a fraction (1 —) ofthe current account





where the constant in (24) is independent of the current values of the
shocks and of y, and where the term [cov(i,0)/c1]yQrepresents the desired21
change in security holdings given the (conditional) estimate of transitory
income. Minimizing the squared value of (24) with respect to y yields the
optimal intervention index:
(25) =1—(1—)cov(,O)
Asis evident, when 8 =0,the optimal intervention index in equation (25) is
identical to that in equation (16). Further, as long as the covariance between
and (+X+c-S) is positive, a rise in the fraction 8 raises the optimal inter-
vention index. Thus
(26)
The higher is the share of transitory income that is absorbed by changes in
the holdings of securities., the larger becomes the desirability of greater
flexibilityof exchange rates. The rationale for that result is quite clear
sincea high value of 8 (whichmaybe viewed as reflecting a high degree of
capital mobility) implies that a larger fraction of the real shocks can be
cushioned through the international capital market and, thereby, reducing
the need for international reserves flows.
Finally, when some of the cushioning is provided by the capital account,
the standard deviation of the optimal balance of payments becomes
2
(27) aB (1 —8)
which is smaller than the magnitude corresponding to the case of no capital
mobility. Again, in the special case for which 8 =0,equation (27) becomes
identical to equation (22').22
11.7 The Supply of Output
Up to this point we have assumed that variations in the supply of out-
put are determined exclusively by the characteristics of the stochastic shock
.Inwhat follows we modify the specification of ecrnation (1) and we assume
a supply function of the Lucas and Rapping (1969) variety. Accordingly, output
is assumed to depend on the ratio of realized to expected prices. Thus,
(28) ='Et-lt
where EtiP denotes the expected price level for period t based on the infor-
mation available at period t-l, h denotes the elasticity of the supply of output
with respect to the ratio of realized to expected prices and, as before, ude-
notes a stochastic disturbance. The specification in equation (28) may be
rationalized in terms of models which allow for a confusion between relative
and absolute price changes like in Lucas (1973) as well as in terms of models
which postulate short—term fixity of nominal wages, e.g., Fischer (1977). Using
the first two terms of a Taylor expansion, the supply of output in equation (28)
canbeapproximated as
(29) y[l +u+h(X+
whereS denotes the percentage change in the exchange rate, i.e., St 9nS —LnS1.
Under fullflexibilityof exchange rates, changes in the rate ensure that
the money market clears. Thus,analogouslyto equation (6),
Mt
(30) kYe =
where,from equation (4'), Stp*e< designates the price level. Differentiating23
equation (30) logarithmically and using equations (15) and (29) for Mt and
the change in the exchange rate may be expressed as
'31'/ -l+h
—t
The equality in equation (31) between the change in the exchange rate
and the sum of the shocks B, is confined to the case in which the exchange
rate is fully flexible. Under managed float =yB,and the s.pply of output
becomes
(29')Yy[l++h(x_ye)]
Using the previous expressions for the values of consumption and output, the
discrepancy between consumption and expected income may be approximated by
(32) [ct —E(Yfl'[p+hX—{(1—i)ctk÷ yh}01y
In this formulation, p +hXmaybereferred to as a real shock. It is
composed of two terms: the first is the genuine output supply shock p. while
the second is induced by the effective foreign price shock x that is translated
into changes in output through the supply elasticity h. Thus, in addition to
its direct monetary effect on the price level, x contributes to output variations.
It is noteworthy that in the special case for which h=0, the value of B reduces
to the one obtained in the previous analysis, and the real shock reduces to p.
The optimal intervention index, y, is computed so as to minimize the
discrepancy between p +hXand [(1 -'y')ck+yh]B.It follows that
(33) bh
where b denotes the regression coefficient of the real shock p +hXon B, i.e.,24
cov(i + h,O)
0
As is evident, in the special case for which the value of the output elasticity
h is zero, equation (33) coincides with (16).
As is revealed by equation (33), the magnitude of y* depends on the sto-
chastic structure of the economy and on whether c&——the propensity to save out
of transitory income, exceeds or falls short of h--the elasticity of output with
respect to the ratio of realized to expected prices. As long as ck > h, the
relation between y* and the variances of i and (E-5) is sixrtilar to the one
• 2 • • 2 analyzed before: a rise in a lowers y while a rise in a( raises it. On
the other hand, when ck < h, these relations are reversed and a rise in the
variance of (—c5) lowers it. The rationale for this reversal is that when the
value of h is high (relative to czk), changes in the price level which result
from unetary shocks induce relatively large changes in output. Thus, when
ck < h, monetary shocks act more like real shocks. Finally, since the foreign
price shock exerts both real and monetary effects, the dependence of y* on a2
depends on the variances of the real and the monetary shocks as well as on the
sign of ck -h:
(34) (ak —h)[(1+ h)a2 -h(l+ h)a2
3a2
x25
III. Optimal Managed Float with Tradable and Non-Tradable Goods
The preceding analysis was confined to an economy whose production
consists only of commodities that are traded internationally. Thisassumption
implied that, except to random deviations from purchasing power parities,
the domestic price level was tied to the foreign price. In this sectionwe
extend the analysis to an economy which produces both traded and non—traded
goods. This production structure relaxes the constraint that was imposed by
the small country assumption. Due to its relative size the economy is a
price taker in the world traded goods market but it is obviously large in the
market for its own non—traded goods. Thus, the relative price of non—traded
goods maynotbe viewed as given to the small economy but rather it is deter-
mined endogenously by the market—clearing conditions. In extending the
analysis we first specify the stochastic characteristics of the production
structureand then proceed to determine the optimal intervention index.
111.1 Equilibrium in the Market for Non-Traded Goods
Production of traded and non-traded goods is assumed to be carried
alonga production possibility frontier which is assumed to be concave to
the origin. Denoting the nominal prices of traded and non-traded goods by
andP'respectively, we define the relative price of non-traded goods
byq pN/pTProduction of traded goods xT isassumed to depend negatively
onthe relative price according to
T T p
(35) X =X(q)e
wherep, which denotes the real shock, is defined in equation (1). Pro-
duction of non-traded goods is assumed to depend positively on the
relativeprice according to
(36) =xN(q)e; '--N(—a2/2,a)26
wheredenotes a stochastic shock that is specific to the production of
non—traded goods. Thus, p may be viewed as an aggregative real shock
which moves the transformation schedule in a uniform way while w may be
viewedas a sector specific real shock.
On the demand side itisassumed that the demand for the twogoods
ishomothetic and that the share of spending on non—traded goods
depends negatively on the relative price. Measuring income as the value of
production in terms of traded goods and denoting the share of spending
on non—traded goods by ,wecan describe the equilibrium in that market (when
income equals spending as under flexible exchange rates) by equation (37):
N w T p N w+p (37) i(q)[qX (q)e +X (q)]e=qX(q)e
Inequation (37), the left-hand side denotes the demand for non-traded goods
while the right-hand side describes the supply. Equation (37) implies that




where q denotes the equilibrium relative price in the absence of shocks
and where m denotes the elasticity of the relative price with respect to
the relative price shock, i.e.,
1
itt
N T —i) + 1+ +
wherendenotesthe elasticity of the share of spending on non—traded goods (defined
to be positive) and where and denote, respectively, the elasticities
of supply of non-traded and traded goods with respect to their relative price.
111.2 The Optimal Intervention Index
When the exchange rate is freely flexible, the demand for real balances27
equalsthe supply at each moment of time. Assuming, as before, that thede-
mand is proportional to income andissubject to a stochastic shock c, money
market equilibrium obtains when
N w T t (39) k[qX (q)e + X (q)]e =
stip*e>e
whereM is defined inequation (15)10 and where the denominator onthe right-
handside denotes the price level P. The parameter 0 denotes thepercentage
change in the exchange rate that is necessary to ensure stock equilibrium
in the money market. By differentiating equation (39) and using (38) for
the equilibrium relative price we note that 9,thepercentage change in the
exchange rate that is required to clear the money market undera freelyflexible
exchange rate regime is11
(40) =+ < +-5+ ij(l-m)
As before, 0 denotes the global shock. In this case, however, it also con-
tains terms that reflect the effects of changes in the relative price which
result from the various shocks. It is relevant to note that when the
specific real shock (w) is zero, the required change in the exchange rate
is, as before, 1I+X+E—cS.
Theabove analysis characterized the equilibrium under a freely flexible
exchange rate regime. When the exchange rate is managed, only a fraction y
of the stock disequilibrium in the money market is allowed to be eliminated
through changes in the exchange rate. In terms of equation (39), when the
10Since theeconomy produces both goods, permanent income in this case
is defined as the value of production in terms of traded goods when the
relative price is q.
deriving equation (40) we have used the envelope theorem for move-
ments along the transformation curve according to which -- =0.28
exchange rate is managed the domestic currency price of traded goods be-
comes p =St_lp*e<e'O,and the money market remains in stock disequilibrium.
Under such circumstances, the value of income diverges from the value of
spending by the resultant flow demand for real balances (as indicated by
equation (13)). Consequently, the demand for non-traded goods is not de-
scribed any more by the left-hand side of equation (37)—-which was only
appropriate for a freely flexible exchange rate regime. Rather, the demand





where denotes the value of output in terms of traded goods. By substituting
the previous expressions for Y, Lt and P and equating the demand for
non-traded goods to the supply, we obtain the equilibrium relative price of
non—traded goods:




Equation (41) reveals that the equilibrium relative price is influenced by
both the specific shock w and the global shock 0. The sensitivity of the
equilibrium price to the specific shock depends on the elasticities of demand
and supply which determine the value of the parameter m. This sensitivity
is independent of the exchange rate regime. On the other hand, the dependence
of the equilibrium price on the global shock depends on the intervention
indexy.Thehigher the value of y the smaller is the effect of the global29
shock. In the extreme case for which y =1,the exchange rate is freely
flexible and the equilibrium relative price depends only on the specific
real shock w. In that case equation (41) coincides with (38).
In order to find the optimal intervention index we turn to the speci-
fication of the objective function. We first note that the objective function
(12) needs to be specified in greater care once there are traded and non—traded
goods. In order to avoid an index nl.]mber problem we express the value of
consumption and production in terms of the general price index which is
assumed to be a Cobb—Douglas function of the prices of thetwogoods. Thus,
if we denote the values of spending and income (nasured in terms of traded
goods) byand 'respectively,their corresponding values in terms of
the general price index are c/q' and Y/q andtheloss function becomes
E[—- E(—)]2
Substituting the previous expressions for the real values of consumption and
income andexpendingin Taylor series we approximate the discrepancy between
realconsumption and expected real income by
(42)[-E()] [( + ) k((p+) + (x + E -- @y+
q q
q0
where y denotes the permanent value of income in terms oftraded goods and
whereq denotes the percentage change in the equilibrium relative price of
non—traded goods. In equation (42), ii+wand(+€-5-O-y+qtp) may be referred to,
respectively, as the real shock and the monetary shock)2 Using equation (40)
may be seen, the real shock does not include the effect of the
relative price change, q, since, due to the envelope theorem, thechange in
price does not affect the value of production. The effect ofq is classified
as a monetary shock since it induces a change in the price level (equal to i4i).30
as the definition of the global shock U and substituting from eauation (41)
for the relative price change, the discrepancy between consumption and
permanent income can be expressed as
c Y —
(42') —t—E(—)][u + wit)—(1—y)(l —it)z)cLkO
q q q0
Minimizingthe loss function amounts to choosing i so as to minimize
the squared discrepancy between .t+wit) and (1-y) (l-it)z)c&O. Following the same
logic of the signal extraction problem of the previous analysis, individuals
who observe the global shock U (through its effect on the exchange rate)
attemptto estimate therealshock component which in this case is composed
ofthe ordinary real shock p plus which represents the effect of the
specific real shock on the real value of aggregate output in terms of the
general price level. Computing the least squares estimate of relevantre—
gression coefficient yields the optimal intervention index:
(43) = — +
1
i cov(p+wit),O)
As in the earliersections, the magnitude of the optimal intervention
index depends on the structure of the economy. In general, the optimal value
of y* declines when the variance of the real shock rises. In this context
both2 anda2 are viewed as real shocks. Also, consistent with the previous
p w
results a higher value of ctkisassociated with a higher value of y.
The new results of this section concern therelationbetween the optimal
interventionindex and the share of the non-traded goods sector (which may
characterize the degree to which the economy is open), as well as between the
optimalintervention index and the elasticities of demand and supplies of31
tradedand non—traded goods. It can be shown that as long as the covariance
between the real shock and the global shock is positive, a higher value of
is associated with a lower value of y*:
(44) 0
Thus,a high share of spending on (and production of) non-traded goods, tends
toreduce the desirability of greater flexibility exchange rates. This result
seems to conflict with some of the well-known arguments on the relationship
between the openness of the economy and the optimal exchange rate regime
[e.g., McK.innon (1963)1. Likewise, by noting that m—-the elasticity of the
relative price of non-traded goods--depends negatively on n, andT, it
follows that
(45) >0, >0, >0
Thus, thehigher is the degree of flexibility in the structure of an economy
the larger becomes the need for increased flexibility of exchange rates.
These results can be rationalized by noting from equation (41) that,
ceteris paribus, a given monetary shock induces a larger change in the relative
price of non—traded goods the higher is the relative share of that sector
and the lower are the elasticities of demand and supply. For a given exchange
rate the change in the relative price is reflected in a change in the nominal
priceof non—traded goods which in turn affects the aggregate price level in
proportion to the relative share .Theinduced change in the price level
mitigatesthe initial disequilibrium and thereby reduces the need for ex-
change rate flexibility. When all goods are internationally traded so that
the internal relative price structure cannot be adjusted, the necessary
changes in the price level can only be obtained through changes in the exchange32
rate.In contrast, the presence of non—traded goods provides for a flexible
internal price structure which is capable of inducing some of the necessary
adjustments in the price level. It follows that the need for exchange rate
flexibility is reduced the higher is the degree of price level flexibility
which, in turn, depends negatively on the elasticities of demand and supply,
13
and positively on the relative share of non—traded goods.
This discussion of the relationship between internal price flexibility
and the optimal exchange rate regime has implications for the choice between
tariffs and quotas as alternative forms of coirnnercial policy. In some respects
the imposition of an import quota (in contrast with the imposition of an
importtariff) maybe viewed as transforming a traded coirifflodity whose relative
priceisdetermined in world markets into a non-traded commodity whose price
isdetermined in the domesticmarket. It follows that the desirability of
exchangerate flexibility is lower for economies with import quotas than for
economies with equivalent import tariffs since the former enjoy a greater
degree of internal price flexibility than the latter. Put differently,
ceteris paribus, a rise in the degree of exchange rate flexibility provides
an incentive to convert quota protection into tariff protection.
Inspection of equation (43)andits comparison with equation (16) re-
veals thateven when the specific shocks are zero, the optimal intervention
index for an economy with non—traded goods is smaller than the corresponding
coefficient for an economy that produces only traded goods. Therefore, the
mere existence of non-traded goods raises the desirability of greater fixity
of exchange rates. The explanation is that even in the absence of specific
13Theconventionalresult that depends positively on y reflects the
assumption that both the foreign currency price of traded goods and the domestic
currency price of non—traded goods are given. In that case changes in the ex-
change rate are the only source for changes in the price level and, as a result,
therequired change in the exchange rate is larger the smaller is the share of
traded goods (i.e., thehigheris y).Our analysis shows that this dependence
isreversed when the priceof non—traded goods is flexible.33
supply shocks changes in demand will be absorbed in part by changes in the
price of non—traded goods. The induced change in the price level will
mitigatethe initial disequilibrium and thereby reduce the need for exchange
rate flexibility. Finally, it can be seen that in the special case for which
=0,equation (43) coincides with (16).
IV. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analyzed aspects of the economics of managed
float. We have shown that the choice of the optimal exchange rate regime
depends on the natureandthe origin of the stochastic shocks thataffect
theeconomy. Generally, the higher is the variance of realshocks which
affectthe supply of goods, thelargerbecomes the desirability of fixity
ofexchange rates. The rationale for that implication is that the balance
of paynnts serves as a shockabsorber which mitigates the effect of real
shockson consumption. The importance of this factor diminishesthe larger
isthe economy's access to world capital markets.On. the other hand, the
desirability of exchange rate flexibility increases the larger are the van-
ancaes of the shocks to the demand for money, to the supply of uoney, to
foreign prices andtopurchasing power parities. All of these shocks exert
a similar effect and their sumwasreferred to as the effective monetary
shock. We have also shown that the desirability of exchange rate flexibility
increases the larger is the propensity to save out of transitory income.
When we extended the analysis to an economy which produces traded andnon—
traded goods it was shown that thedesirabilityof exchange rate flexibility
diminishesthe higher is the share of non—traded goods relative to traded goods
and the lower are the elasticities of demand and supply of the two goods.
Asa general comment itshould be noted that in this paper monetary34
policyand foreign exchange intervention were treated as being close sub-
stitutes. In fact, as a first approximation, in our framework, these two
policies are non—distinguishable. It is believed that this feature of the
model is much closer to reality than would be the other extreme in which
monetary policy and foreign exchange policies are viewed as two independent
policy instruments.
The special role of the exchange rate should also be noted. In our
framework the exchange rate (and thereby the price level) is determined to
a large extent by considerations of asset market equilibrium. This character-
istic is in accord with the recent developments of the theory of exchange
rate determination.
An important characteristic of the approach is that the choice of an
exchange rate regime is an integral part of a general optimization process.
Itcalls, therefore, for an explicit specificationof the objective function
asaprerequisite to the analysis. This feature is emphasized since such
a specification of the objective function has been neglected by much of the
writings in the area.
Alimitation of the analysis is that except for the discussion in
section 11.6, the model did not incorporate explicitly the implications of
an integrated world capital market which reflects itself in the capital
account of the balance of payments and which prevents insulation from Sto-
chastic shocks to world interest rates. It should be emphasized, hoever,
that the mere access to world capital markets and the ability toborroware
unlikely to alter the essentials of our analysis since they are unlikely to
eliminate the occasional need for using international reserves. Most countries
cannot expect to be able to borrow any amount at a given rate of interest.
Rather, the borrowing rate is likely to rise when the country's net debtor35
position rises. This rise reflects the deterioration of the quality of the
loans which is due to the deterioration of the economy's credit worthiness.
As a result, countries will find it useful to hold and use international reserves
in order to reduce the likelihood of facing a steeply rising cost of borrowing.
In that sense, the holdings of international reserves may be viewed as a form
of forward borrowing that is likely to continue even when capital markets
are highly integrated.
It should be noted that the present specification of the nature of
the shocks is somewhat biased in favor of government intervention
since to some extent the shocks have been presund to originate from the
instability of the private sector rather than from the actions of government
policies.Furthermore, the concept of the optimal intervention index that
isimplied by the optimal managed float was developed as a policy prescription
for the monetary authorities. This was motivated by realism and could be
rationalizedin terms of the presumption that, compared with the private
sector, the monetary authorities possess superior information concerning
their own actions. In principle, however, much of the optimal mix could
also be performed by the private sector.
Finally, it is relevant to note that as a practical matter it is un-
likely that a policymaker will be capable of implementing policies with
sufficient precision so as to distinguish between cases in which, for example,
=0.2and those for which= 0.3.Thus, when the optimal intervention
indexturns out to be about 0.3or less, it is likely that the practical
policywould be that of a fixed exchange rate; likewise, when the optimal
intervention index turns out to be about 0.7 or more, it is likely that the
practical policy would be that of flexible exchange rates. In that sense
the choice of an exchange rate regime may be viewed as the outcome of the
search for a second—best solution and the analysis in this paper should be
interpreted as providing a qualitative guideforsuch a choice.36
REFERENCES
Aizenxnan, Joshua, "Optimal Managed Flexibility of Exchange Rate," un-
published manuscript,University of Chicago, 1980.
Boyer,Russell S., "Optimal Foreign Exchange Market Intervention," Journal
ofPolitical Economy 86,no. 6, Decextber 1978, 1045—55.
Buiter,Willem, "Optimal Foreign Exchange Market Intervention withRational
Expectations,"unpublished manuscript, London School of Economics, 1977.
Enders, Walter and Harvey E. Lapan, "Stability, RandomDisturbancesand the
Exchange Rate Regime," Southern Economic Journal 45, July1979,49—70.
Fischer, Stanley, "Stability and Exchange Rate System in a Monetarist Model
of the Balance of Payments," in R. Z. Aliber (ed.), The Political
Economy of Monetary Reform, Montclair, NJ: Allanheld, OsmunandCo.,
1976, 59—73.
__________"Long—TermContracts, Rational Expectations and the Optimal Policy
Rule,"JournalofPolitical Economy 85, 1, February1977,191—206.
Flood, Robert P., "Capital Mobility and the Choice of Exchange Rate System,"
International Economic Review 20, no. 2, June 1979, 405—16.
Frenkel, Jacob A., "An Analysis of the Conditions Necessary for a Return to
Greater Fixity of Exchange Rates," Report for the Department of
State, U.S. Government, Contract No. 1722—520100, 1976.
"The Demand for International Reserves Under Pegged and Flexible
Exchange Rate Regimes and Aspects of the Economics of Managed Float,"
in H. Frisch and G. Schwödianen (eds.), The Economics of Flexible
Exchange Rates, Berlin: Duncker and Huxrtblot, supplement to Kredit
undKapital,Heft 6, 1980. Also reprinted in D. Bigman andT.Taya
(eds.), The Functioning of Flexible Exchange Rates: Theory, Evidence
and Policy Implications, Canüridge: Ballinger, 1980.
Gray, JoAnna,"WageIndexation: A Macroeconomic Approach," Journal of
Monetary Economics 2, no. 2, April 1976, 231-46.37
Kenen,Peter B., "The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View,"
in R. A. Mundell andA.K. Swoboda (eds.) Monetary Problem of the
InternationalEconomy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969,
41—60.
Laffer,Arthur B.,"Two ArgumentsforFixed Rates,"inH. G. Johnson and
A.K. Swoboda (eds.) The Economics of Coitmon Currencies, London:
Allen &Unwin,1973.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr., "Some International Evidence on Output—Inflation Trade-
offs," American Economic Review 63, no. 3, June 1973, 326—34.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. and Leonard A. Rapping, "Real Wages, Employment and the
Price Level," Journal of Political Economy 77, September/October 1969,
721—54.
McKinnon, Ronald I., "Optimal Currency Areas," American Economic Review
52, September 1963, 717—24.
Modigliani, Franco and Hossein Askari, "The International Transfer of Capital
and the Propagation of Domestic Disturbances under Alternative Payment
Systems," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review 26, no. 107,
December 1973, 295—310.
Mundell, Robert A., "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas," American Economic
Review51, November 1961, 509—17. Reprinted as Chapter 12 in his
International Economics, 1968.
_________"UncommonArguments for Common Currencies," in H. C. Johnson and
A. K. Swoboda (eds.), The Economics of Common Currencies, London:
Allen &Unwin,1973.
Poole, William, "Optimal Choice of Monetary Instruments in a Simple Stochastic
Macro—Model," Quarterly Journal of Economics 83, May 1970, 197-216.
Stein, Jerome L.., "The Optimum Foreign Exchange Market," American Economic
Review 53, no. 3, June 1963, 384—402.